A Model Of Selection and Policy Concerns
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Delgado-Vega, Alvaro; Shaver, Benjamin
署名单位：
University of Chicago; Northwestern University
刊物名称：
ECONOMIC JOURNAL
ISSN/ISSBN：
0013-0133
DOI：
10.1093/ej/ueaf102
发表日期：
2026
关键词：
摘要：
A principal designs a policy by weighing the goals she shares with an agent and those that divide them. The policy's success depends on the principal's unknown quality and the agent's decision to help. After the policy succeeds or fails, a committee awards a prize to the actor with the higher expected quality. In equilibrium, the agent helps to avoid blame for failure or share credit for success. The principal benefits from exploiting the agent's selection concerns to shift the policy in her favour while obtaining the agent's help, even if doing so lowers the probability she is selected.