Foreign Currency Debt and Disagreement

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Benhima, Kenza; Blengini, Isabella; Merrouche, Ouarda
• 署名单位: University of Lausanne; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Applied Sciences & Arts Western Switzerland; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueaf076
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: financial development; exchange-rates; HOME BIAS; determinants; investors; RISK; fundamentals; equilibrium; INFORMATION; MARKETS

摘要

This paper highlights the disagreement channel of corporate foreign currency borrowing. In our model, if domestic agents have better information than foreign lenders on the state of the economy, foreign currency borrowing might arise if the fundamentals are strong relative to what public signals suggest to foreigners. In these situations, international markets overestimate future currency depreciation, which increases the cost of borrowing in domestic currency. Domestic agents then borrow more in foreign currency because they disagree with international lenders' pessimistic assessment. This mechanism is consistent with the data: empirically, we show that, controlling for fundamentals, negative public signals are associated with positive domestic currency excess returns and with more foreign currency borrowing.