Does Combating Corruption Reduce Clientelism?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bobonis, Gustavo J.; Gertler, Paul J.; Gonzalez-Navarro, Marco; Nichter, Simeon
• 署名单位: University of Toronto; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of California System; University of California San Diego
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueaf082
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: machine politics; field experiment; ACCOUNTABILITY; PERSPECTIVES; incentives; bribes; BRAZIL; audits

摘要

Does combating corruption reduce clientelism? To investigate this question, we focus on a policy that has been widely used across the world: anti-corruption audits. We examine the impact of Brazil's prominent audit programme on clientelism using a novel survey of rural citizens. Randomised audits reduce politicians' provision of campaign handouts, decrease citizens' demands for private goods, and reduce requests fulfilled by politicians. We investigate mechanisms by which audits may reduce clientelism, and find that audits significantly reduce citizens' willingness to supply clientelistic votes.