Non-Compete Agreements, Wages and Efficiency: Theory and Evidence from Brazilian Football

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Guimaraes, Bernardo; Pessoa, Joao Paulo; Ponczek, Vladimir
• 署名单位: Getulio Vargas Foundation
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueaf103
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: TRANSFER FEE REGULATIONS; noncompete agreements; labor-market; superstars; mobility; search; sports

摘要

The Pel & eacute; Act banned non-compete agreements in Brazilian football in 1998. We explore this policy change to study how non-competes affect the labour market. The Act changed the wage profile heterogeneously, reducing young players' wages and raising salaries for older ones. Turnover increased slightly. We develop and structurally estimate a model and show that changing the parameter capturing the non-compete friction leads to the changes observed in the data. From the estimation, we recover match efficiency before and after the Act and show that efficiency gains are outweighed by distributional effects.