Research Registries and the Credibility Crisis: An Empirical and Theoretical Investigation

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Abrams, Eliot; Libgober, Jonathan; List, John A.
• 署名单位: University of Southern California; University of Chicago; Australian National University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueaf120
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: CLINICALTRIALS.GOV RESULTS DATABASE; INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE; TRIAL REGISTRATION; reproducibility; TRANSPARENCY; outcomes; update; POLICY; drugs; time

摘要

We analyse one prominent policy solution to the credibility crisis in experimental research-research registries-with primary focus on the AEA RCT Registry. We find that the AEA RCT Registry has had a limited impact to date. A majority of recent economics experiments are not registered, only about half of those registered did so prior to intervention and most of these preregistrations lack sufficient detail. We find broad similarities when comparing these patterns to ClinicalTrials.gov. We then advance an economic model of registration to explore potential improvements to registries generally. The model shows that banning late registration can significantly increase registry effectiveness.