Flexible enforcement and fine adjustment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Decker, Christopher S.
• 署名单位: University of Nebraska System; University of Nebraska System; University of Nebraska Lincoln
• 刊物名称: REGULATION & GOVERNANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1748-5983
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1748-5991.2007.00019.x
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 312-328
• 关键词: environmental-regulation; PUNISHMENT; crime

摘要

This paper considers the level of, and changes in, optimal noncompliance penalties under the following conditions: (i) where the regulator responsible for setting policy parameters, Such as a penalty, is different from (and thus may have a different objective from) the regulator responsible for enforcing existing regulations; and (ii) where enforcement behavior changes from one in which enforcers are unresponsive to overtures on the part of firms to increase compliance to one in which enforcers are responsive to such overtures. The model developed shows that when enforcers switch from unresponsive to responsive enforcement, the optimal penalties for noncompliance need to be reduced. The analysis also gives insights as to what variables dictate the degree of penalty reduction.