Domestic drivers of transgovernmental regulatory cooperation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bach, David; Newman, Abraham
• 署名单位: Yale University; Georgetown University
• 刊物名称: REGULATION & GOVERNANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1748-5983
• DOI: 10.1111/rego.12047
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 395-417
• 关键词: policy; diffusion; networks; agencies; state; institutions; FOUNDATIONS; DELEGATION; POLITICS; dilemma

摘要

Transgovernmental cooperation among domestic regulators has generated considerable interest among scholars and policymakers. While previous research has focused on describing such regulatory networks, we know very little about what drives individual jurisdictions to join them. The question of membership is important because it determines the reach of rules and standards promulgated by a given network, and because it is logically prior to understanding the rulemaking dynamic within a network. We develop a set of hypotheses that highlight the role of domestic political factors in shaping network membership. Our empirical analysis, using an original data set for transgovernmental cooperation in securities and insurance regulation, finds that the institutional form of domestic market regulation, as well as the relative domestic weight of the industry, are closely correlated with membership. All else equal, jurisdictions with independent regulatory agencies and those where the industry in question represents a large share of gross domestic product are much more likely to join the respective network than jurisdictions without these characteristics. The paper underscores the important interactions between domestic and international factors for informal cooperation, an issue that has become increasingly central to global governance.