Timing as a source of regulatory influence: A technical elite network analysis of global finance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lall, Ranjit
• 署名单位: Harvard University
• 刊物名称: REGULATION & GOVERNANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1748-5983
• DOI: 10.1111/rego.12050
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 125-143
• 关键词: international-politics

摘要

Rules governing the international financial system are the subject of some of the most intense distributional battles waged in any area of global governance. Who wins and who loses such battles - and why? I develop a novel analytical framework - technical elite network (TEN) theory - which explains the widely varying levels of influence that stakeholders enjoy over global financial standards. TEN theory draws attention to how issue-specific characteristics of international finance - in particular, its highly technical and complex nature - shape the distributional consequences of global regulatory processes. It posits that such characteristics influence distributional outcomes by (i) affecting who claims first-mover position and, thus, sets the agenda in global financial rulemaking, and (ii) ensuring that proposals made by first movers are increasingly difficult to alter at later stages of rulemaking. I provide empirical evidence for the theory by examining two regulatory regimes that are central to the efficiency and stability of the global financial system: the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the International Accounting Standards Board.