The unstable core of global finance: Contingent valuation and governance of international accounting standards

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mugge, Daniel; Stellinga, Bart
• 署名单位: University of Amsterdam
• 刊物名称: REGULATION & GOVERNANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1748-5983
• DOI: 10.1111/rego.12052
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 47-62
• 关键词: politics; CRISIS; COOPERATION; EU

摘要

Accounting standards are the foundations of the financial regulatory edifice, and global financial governance is no more stable than the asset valuations that feed it. Yet for two decades and up to this day, no international accounting rule for financial instruments - the bulk of banks' balance sheets - has emerged that was more than a temporary fix, to be succeeded by further reforms. We show how banking regulators have been central to this dynamic and how their support for applying fair value accounting to financial instruments, the cornerstone of regulatory debate, has oscillated throughout the whole period. The two common international political economy approaches to global financial governance, which analyze it either as interest-based bargaining or as ideas-driven expert governance, fail to account for this pattern. In contrast, we show how the contingency of financial valuations itself has made it impossible for regulators to embrace or reject a stable set of accounting rules.