Authoritarian but responsive: Local regulation of industrial energy efficiency in Jiangsu, China

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Zhu, Junming; Chertow, Marian R.
• 署名单位: Tsinghua University; Yale University
• 刊物名称: REGULATION & GOVERNANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1748-5983
• DOI: 10.1111/rego.12172
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 384-404
• 关键词: environmental-policy implementation; institutional constraints; enforcement styles; intensity; performance; management; officials; guangzhou; impacts; REFORM

摘要

Regulatory behavior and effectiveness in authoritarian settings are subject to alternative characterizations. By tracing enforcement processes through a variety of case studies, this article proposes and refines a new model, at least with respect to energy efficiency regulations in China: authoritarian but responsive. Local rulemaking and operationalization is authoritarian, with strong and coordinative bodies of regulation, strategic plans, and active involvement of local authorities. Local authorities, however, often find themselves facing a welter of laws imposed on companies that create competing priorities for these local officials who then must struggle to find pragmatic solutions. On numerous occasions, such satisficing behavior by local officials makes them responsive to the performance and demands of regulated firms. Embedded in the decentralized authoritarian context, the authoritarian but responsive approach is found to be a rational choice of local governments and different from previous conceptualizations. It helps local governments coordinate across a diverse array of regulatory issues. Drawing on environmental enforcement in China, the model provides consistent explanations for the seemingly changing and discretionary enforcement incidents.