Perils of development funding? The tale of EU Funds and grand corruption in Central and Eastern Europe

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fazekas, Mihaly; King, Lawrence Peter
• 署名单位: University of Cambridge
• 刊物名称: REGULATION & GOVERNANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1748-5983
• DOI: 10.1111/rego.12184
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 405-430
• 关键词: government; QUALITY; governance; collusion

摘要

Given the unprecedented scale of intergovernmental development funding and the importance of institutional quality for human well-being, it is imperative to precisely understand the impact of development funds on corruption. In Europe, European Union (EU) Funds provide a boost to public spending in recipient member states while introducing additional corruption controls. We investigate whether EU Funds increase high-level corruption in the Czech Republic and Hungary in 2009-2012. We analyze newly collected data from over 100,000 public procurement contracts to develop objective corruption risk indicators and link them to agency level data in the public sector. Propensity score matching estimations suggest that EU funds increase corruption risk by up to 34 percent. The negative effects are largely attributable to overly formalistic compliance and EU Funds overriding domestic accountability mechanisms in public organizations entirely dependent on external funds. The policy implications are profound: governments should reduce barriers to market entry by lowering red tape and prevent excessive concentration of funds.