The Regulatory Gift: Politics, regulation and governance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Browne, Jude
• 署名单位: University of Cambridge
• 刊物名称: REGULATION & GOVERNANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1748-5983
• DOI: 10.1111/rego.12194
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 203-218
• 关键词: public-interest; capture

摘要

This article introduces the regulatory gift as a conceptual framework for understanding a particular form of government-led deregulation that is presented as central to the public interest. Contra to theories of regulatory capture, government corruption, insider personal interest, or profit-seeking theories of regulation, the regulatory gift describes reform that is overtly designed by government to reduce or reorient regulators' functions to the advantage of the regulated and in line with market objectives on a potentially macro (rather than industry-specific) scale. As a conceptual framework, the regulatory gift is intended to be applicable across regulated sectors of democratic states and in this article the empirical sections evidence the practice of regulatory gifting in contemporary United Kingdom (UK) politics. Specifically, this article analyses the 2011 UK Public Bodies Act, affecting some 900 regulatory public bodies and its correlative legislation, the 2014 Regulator's Code, the 2015 Deregulation Act, and the 2016 Enterprise Bill. The article concludes that while in some cases the regulatory gift may be aligned with the public interest - delivering on cost reduction, enhancing efficiency, and stimulating innovation - this will not always be the case. As the case study of the regulatory body, the UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, demonstrates, despite the explicit claims made by legislators, the regulatory gift has the potential to significantly undermine the public interest.