Complaining about rivals: Indifference, cooperation, and competition in the governance of advertising

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cluley, Robert
• 署名单位: University of Nottingham
• 刊物名称: REGULATION & GOVERNANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1748-5983
• DOI: 10.1111/rego.12211
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 316-327
• 关键词: self-regulation; consumer

摘要

What should rivals do when they see competitors breaking agreed rules within systems of self-regulation? This study investigates compliant behavior among British advertisers to empirically answer this question. It analyses five years of complaints (n = 146,062) and adjudications (n = 4,832) published by the self-regulatory body for the British advertising industry. The majority of firms adopt a strategy of indifference and rarely regulate their rivals. Highly engaged firms either adopt an angelic strategy as they use their resources to complain about their rivals; a deviant strategy as they are subject to a large number of complaints; or a predatory strategy as they attack their rivals through advertising regulation. This illustrates a unique form of regulatory capture in which a regulatory system becomes an arena of competition for some actors while continuing as a governance mechanism for others.