Does appealability foster more citizen-friendly decisions at the street level?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gershgoren, Sagi; Cohen, Nissim
• 署名单位: University of Haifa
• 刊物名称: REGULATION & GOVERNANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1748-5983
• DOI: 10.1111/rego.12503
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 1058-1075
• 关键词: social value orientation; public-sector; dark side; bureaucrats; INFORMATION; motivation; judges; ACCOUNTABILITY; performance; DISCRETION

摘要

Unbiased conduct is an essential part of the social contract between the state and its citizens. Yet, when tasked with settling disputes between citizens and other state officials, are public administrators truly impartial in their resolutions? Such a question is vital for street-level bureaucrats whom the public perceives as the face of governance. This study investigates the relations between the pro-citizen tendencies in street-level bureaucrats' resolutions, their internal appealability, and the discretionary space under which they are made. Using quantitative analysis of real-world lower-court rulings in Israeli tax disputes between 1980 and 2021, the research findings indicate that unregulated expansion of street-level bureaucrats' discretionary space relates to favoring the state's arguments in their resolutions and may impair procedural fairness. The findings also imply that regulation promoting citizens' right to appeal such resolutions within their agency, can increase street-level bureaucrats' pro-citizen tendencies and potentially counteract such outcomes.