Affidavit aversion: Public preferences for trust-based policy instruments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hilo-Merkovich, Rinat; Peer, Eyal; Feldman, Yuval
• 署名单位: Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Bar Ilan University
• 刊物名称: REGULATION & GOVERNANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1748-5983
• DOI: 10.1111/rego.12560
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 970-986
• 关键词: administrative burden; SANCTIONS; vignettes; lawyers; COSTS

摘要

Regulators who aim to reduce administrative burdens often promote trust-based policy instruments, such as legal affidavits or honesty pledges, as substitutes to traditional bureaucratic procedures. However, little is known on how the general public view such instruments, and whether people would actually comply with them, and under what circumstances. Using a series of experimental vignettes, we examine public preferences toward these instruments under different conditions and contexts. We find that overall, people exhibit an aversion to using affidavits, even when they are inexpensive and can save a considerable amount of time compared to the traditional bureaucratic procedure. In contrast, honesty pledges are largely preferred over both the standard procedure and signing an affidavit. We discuss factors influencing the public choice of trust-based instruments and offer recommendations to help policymakers promote public compliance using behaviorally informed policy instruments.