Deceptive choice architecture and behavioral audits: A principles-based approach

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mills, Stuart
• 署名单位: University of Leeds; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: REGULATION & GOVERNANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1748-5983
• DOI: 10.1111/rego.12590
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 1426-1441
• 关键词: nudge

摘要

Regulators are increasingly concerned about deceptive, online choice architecture, including dark patterns and behavioral sludge. From a behavioral science perspective, fostering a regulatory environment which reduces the economic harm caused by deceptive designs, while safeguarding the benefits of well-meaning behavioral insights, is essential. This article argues for a principles-based approach and proposes behavioral audits as a tool to support this approach.