More control-less agency slack? Principal control and the risk of agency slack in international organizations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jankauskas, Vytautas; Knill, Christoph; Bayerlein, Louisa
• 署名单位: Zeppelin University; University of Munich; European University Institute; Zeppelin University
• 刊物名称: REGULATION & GOVERNANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1748-5983
• DOI: 10.1111/rego.12525
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 1171-1192
• 关键词: european-commission; world-bank; POLICY; DELEGATION; mechanisms; STANDARDS; POLITICS; unions; LOGICS

摘要

Principal-agent theorizing is based on the idea of a linear inverse relationship between principal control and agency slack: the higher the control over the agent, the less likely is the agent to slack. In this paper, we challenge this assumption by explicitly taking the varying nature of agents into account. While control may reduce the agent's room for maneuver, it does not explain the extent to which different agents are inclined to put efforts in circumventing these obstacles. Focusing on international organizations (IOs), we measure member states' as principals' control over IO administrations as their agents as well as the latter's intrinsic propensity to slack across eight major IOs. The analysis shows that low control by the principal is not necessarily associated with run-away agents, whereas high control is not necessarily associated with servant-like agents. The assumed control-slack relationship can thus be distorted and determining an ideal level of control is not possible without considering the agent's entrepreneurialism.