Global contagion risk and IMF credit cycles: Emergency exits and revolving doors

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kaplan, Stephen B.; Shim, Sujeong
• 署名单位: George Washington University; New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi
• 刊物名称: REGULATION & GOVERNANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1748-5983
• DOI: 10.1111/rego.12562
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 851-873
• 关键词: POLITICAL-ECONOMY; PROGRAMS; implementation; NEGOTIATIONS; text

摘要

Why does the International Monetary Fund (IMF) exit its lending relationships before member states have resolved their financial crises? It is particularly surprising given that the IMF often resumes its lending shortly after its withdrawal. We argue that IMF withdrawals are conditioned by global contagion risk. The tension between the IMF's mandate of global financial stability and its limited financial resources compels the IMF's early exit from its lending relationships. During periods of high global contagion, the IMF prioritizes its mandate by continuing its lending despite noncompliance. However, when the IMF perceives minimal contagion risk, it focuses on moral hazard, and willingly cuts its lending ties to preserve its reputation and resources for future crises. Employing a comparative analysis of IMF decision-making in two of its largest borrowers, Argentina and Greece, we find supportive evidence for our claims.