Politics, bureaucracy, and farm credit

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Meier, KJ; Polinard, JL; Wrinkle, RD
• 署名单位: Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; University of Texas System; University of Texas Rio Grande Valley
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3352
• DOI: 10.2307/3110112
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 293-302
• 关键词: AGRICULTURAL POLICY; ACCOUNTABILITY

摘要

The most common view of political institutions and their control over bureaucracy is the principal-agent model That model assumes that politicians and bureaucrats disagree over goals and the means to obtain those goals It also assumes that bureaucrats have access to valuable information that politicians do not have. Agricultural credit is a policy area that does not fit these assumptions. In it we find a version of bottom-line oversight, whereby the agency has clear goals and political institutions (in this case Congress) act only when serious problems occur. This smoke detector form of oversight is confirmed with a time series analysis of agricultural credit outputs.