Critical reflections on hamiltonian perspectives on rule-making and legislative proposal initiatives by the chief executive

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Newbold, Stephanie P.; Rosenbloom, David H.
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; American University
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3352
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6210.2007.00796.x
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 1049-1056
• 关键词: Bureaucracy; anyway

摘要

Reflecting on James Hart and Edwin Witte's analysis affords the field a rare opportunity to observe the complexities of a separation-of-powers system in action. In making their case, they underscored the importance of the president having a substantial supervisory role in the way administrative agencies write rules and propose legislative measures. As a result, they ignored Congress's constitutional responsibility to supervise, regulate, and guide these areas of administrative law. Their highly controversial arguments not only provide the field with a broader understanding of the overall mission of the Brownlow Committee, but also we can see how they influenced the development of the administrative state.