The Centralization/Decentralization Paradox in Civil Service Reform: How Government Structure Affects Democratic Training of Civil Servants

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Witesman, Eva M.; Wise, Charles R.
• 署名单位: Brigham Young University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3352
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6210.2008.01945.x
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 116-127
• 关键词: management; decentralization; revolution

摘要

We hypothesize that the structural characteristics (i.e., centralization versus decentralization) of government affect the availability of training in values and skills that are fundamental to democratization. We test our hypothesis in statistical models predicting anticorruption training and policy skills training, using a model of technical skills training for comparison. We find that centralized government structure significantly increases the odds of receiving both anticorruption training and policy skills training. In contrast, we find no statistical correlation between government structure and receipt of technical skills training. In light of these empirical results, we describe a theoretical paradox in civil service reform associated with democratization: While the end goal of such reform is decentralized government with local services and a professionalized civil service, reform itself may best supported by a centralized environment to achieve the democratic value and skills training needed to support transition to democracy.