Resource Dependence, Alternative Supply Sources, and the Design of Formal Contracts

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Malatesta, Deanna; Smith, Craig R.
• 署名单位: Purdue University System; Purdue University; Purdue University in Indianapolis; University of Arizona
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3352
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6210.2011.02392.x
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 608-617
• 关键词: POWER; performance; CHOICE; FORCE; SCOPE

摘要

Employing a resource dependence theoretical framework, the authors analyze a set of recently awarded contracts between the Environmental Protection Agency and its suppliers to determine how joint dependence, supplier dependence, and government dependence affect contract design-specifically, the decision to use a cost-plus (flexible) contract. Findings provide evidence that organizations choose contract designs that will reduce uncertainty related to securing critical resources. However, different dimensions of dependence have different effects: (1) higher levels of joint dependence lead to more flexible governance forms; (2) the lack of alternative suppliers is a more important factor than high levels of financial dependence; and (3) the parties involved in government procurement are likely to perceive government as a unique type of organization, which, in turn, has implications for contract design choices. The authors conclude with managerial strategies for restructuring power/dependence relationships to achieve the contract design most likely to yield a surplus in the exchange.