Campaign-Style Enforcement and Regulatory Compliance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Liu, Nicole Ning; Lo, Carlos Wing-Hung; Zhan, Xueyong; Wang, Wei
• 署名单位: City University of Hong Kong; Hong Kong Polytechnic University; Jinan University
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3352
• DOI: 10.1111/puar.12285
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 85-95
• 关键词: environmental-protection; CHINA; management; ISO-14001; POLICY; LAW; implementation; certification; institutions; bureaucracy

摘要

This article examines the recoupling mechanism of campaign-style enforcement and its effects on environmental regulatory compliance. Drawing on the policy implementation literature and institutional theory, the authors develop a conceptual model of campaign-style enforcement in which both resource mobilization and power redistribution are theorized to address decoupling problems in regulatory compliance. The two-pathway recoupling mechanism is evidenced by an empirical investigation of the implementation of China's energy conservation and emission reduction policy as part of that country's 11th Five-Year Plan. Findings suggest that campaign-style enforcement can effectively improve regulatory compliance when it addresses the efficiency/legitimacy conflict by providing policy incentives and reorganizing a clear hierarchy of political authority. The article concludes with a discussion of the strengths and limitations of campaign-style enforcement.