Predicting Political Influence on State Ethics Commissions: Of Course We Are Ethical-Nudge Nudge, Wink Wink

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rauh, Jonathan
• 署名单位: University of South Carolina System; University of South Carolina Columbia
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3352
• DOI: 10.1111/puar.12290
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 98-110
• 关键词: presidential power; CORRUPTION; performance; bureaucracy; governors; capacity; DESIGN; MODEL

摘要

This article explores the ability of elected officials to affect the autonomy of state ethics commissions. The author examines autonomy as a function of the capacity of ethics commissions to control their finances and personnel decisions and how the presence or absence of that capacity affects whether bureaucratic structures can function independently of politics. Using data from the 2011 State Integrity Investigation, the analysis extends previous arguments concerning political actors' desire to affect ethics commissions. Findings suggest that elected officials use their positions to control the makeup of commission leadership and financial resources, with the goal of decreasing commissions' ability to act autonomously.