Regulation by Reputation: Monitoring and Sanctioning in Nonprofit Accountability Clubs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Tremblay-Boire, Joannie; Prakash, Aseem; Gugerty, Mary Kay
• 署名单位: University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3352
• DOI: 10.1111/puar.12539
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 712-722
• 关键词: self-regulation; PROGRAMS; GOVERNMENT; MARKET

摘要

Nonprofits seek to enhance their reputation for responsible management by joining voluntary regulation mechanisms such as accountability clubs. Because external stakeholders cannot fully observe nonprofits' compliance with club obligations, clubs incorporate mechanisms to monitor compliance and impose sanctions. Yet including monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms increases the cost of club membership for nonprofits. What factors account for the variation in the strength of monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms in voluntary accountability clubs? An analysis of 224 clubs suggests that stringent monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms are more likely in fund-raising-focused clubs, clubs that offer certification (as opposed to only outlining a code of conduct), and clubs with greater longevity. The macro context in which clubs function also shapes their institutional design: clubs in OECD countries and clubs with global membership are less likely to incorporate monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms than clubs in non-OECD countries and single-country clubs, respectively.