What Explains Agency Heads' Length of Tenure? Testing Managerial Background, Performance, and Political Environment Effects

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Petrovsky, Nicolai; James, Oliver; Moseley, Alice; Boyne, George A.
• 署名单位: University of Kentucky; University of Exeter; University of Exeter; Cardiff University
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3352
• DOI: 10.1111/puar.12735
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 591-602
• 关键词: Management turnover; GOVERNMENT; CONSEQUENCES; appointees; service; models; EXIT

摘要

There are a number of influences on how long an agency head serves. The importance of particular influences, in turn, depends on the prospective destination of the agency head: elsewhere in the public sector, the private sector, or retirement. The authors estimate survival models of agency heads' tenure using panel data on British central government executive agencies from 1989 to 2012. Findings suggest that chief executives of poorly performing agencies are encouraged to retire sooner. There is no evidence that a change in political control increases the risk of any form of exit, suggesting that political pressure to leave is not substantial for this type of official. Outsiders-agency heads recruited from outside central government-are relatively difficult to retain for a longer time, such that potential shortfalls in suitable managers caused by retirements in an aging workforce may be difficult to make up by appointing from this source.