Controlling Administrative Discretion Promotes Social Equity? Evidence from a Natural Experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cardenas, Sergio; Ramirez de la Cruz, Edgar E.
• 署名单位: Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas A.C. (CIDE)
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3352
• DOI: 10.1111/puar.12590
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 80-89
• 关键词: performance; indicators; proverbs; evil

摘要

Although social equity has been a formal pillar of public administration for decades, identifying mechanisms through which public officials inadvertently reproduce unfair conditions remains a relevant topic. In particular, it is important to understand how the habits and practices of street-level bureaucrats may result in an unjust allocation of public resources. This article provides evidence on how the administrative discretion conferred on school principals may result in an efficient but unfair condition regarding the allocation of students across schools, thus undermining social equity. By exploiting a natural experiment, we are able to provide reliable evidence on how controlling administrative discretion decreases the segregation of students based on their socioeconomic status.