Politics, Competence, and Performance: Evidence from the US State Budget Agencies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Yu, Jinhai; Jennings, Edward T., Jr.
• 署名单位: Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; University of Kentucky
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3352
• DOI: 10.1111/puar.13277
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 500-518
• 关键词: legislative term limits; neutral competence; revenue forecasts; public-opinion; POLICY; PROFESSIONALISM; responsiveness; GOVERNMENT; dichotomy; outcomes

摘要

The relationship between administrative competence and political responsiveness is central to public administration theories. This study examines the conditional effects of competence on performance as moderated by politics. Synthesizing the theories of neutral competence and responsive competence, we propose a model of contingent competence. We argue that the impact of competence on performance is conditional on both the preferences of political principals and the degree of political control as indicated by agency politicization. With multiple indicators of state fiscal performance, the empirical test uses data on US state budget agencies between 1986 and 2008. The results support the proposition. When budget agencies are highly politicized, competence of budget agencies influences state fiscal performance in accordance with the preferences of Democratic and Republican elected officials when one or the other party controls state governments. The findings enhance the understanding of how institutional designs shape bureaucratic politics and agency performance.