Reputation-Sourced Authority and the Prospect of Unchecked Bureaucratic Power

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bertelli, Anthony M.; Busuioc, Madalina
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Leiden University - Excl LUMC; Leiden University
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3352
• DOI: 10.1111/puar.13281
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 38-48
• 关键词: policy; DELEGATION; agencies; service; models; COSTS

摘要

We explore the democratic implications of a reputational account of bureaucratic authority. While an influential literature has examined the relevance ofreputation-and mutual exchange between principals and agents in public organizations generally-the normative implications of these insights have largely escaped scrutiny. We discuss how reputation-building impacts both the ability and the motivation of principals to oversee administrative policymaking. We argue that reputation-sourced authority eschews er ante incentives through the claims-making and maneuvering of bureaucrats as they develop reputations with audiences. At the same time, it de-legitimizes ex post oversight because monitoring and compliance must compete both with reputational authority and with resistance from the audiences that are the very sources of such authority.