State Fiscal Constraints and Local Responses: Evidence from the Property Tax Limit Overrides in Massachusetts

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wei, Wenchi; Butler, J. S.
• 署名单位: Renmin University of China; University of Kentucky
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3352
• DOI: 10.1111/puar.13186
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 399-413
• 关键词: expenditure limitations; GOVERNMENT; institutions; support; CONSEQUENCES; voters; revenue; IMPACT; trust; form

摘要

This research examines the determinants of the likelihood of property tax limit override attempts and successes in the context of Massachusetts's Proposition 21/2. The authors apply the Leviathan government theory, median voter theory, and agenda-setting theory to develop theoretical expectations and use data from Massachusetts municipalities for 1991-2013 as a sample for empirical tests. Override attempts are not randomly proposed; therefore, the two-stage Heckman selection model is used to address selection bias in the investigation of the likelihood of override successes. Results show that a higher property tax rate reduces the likelihood of government officials' override attempts, but previous override experiences have a positive influence. Voters bearing a higher property tax rate are less likely to approve the override, but override experiences in the previous year and the menu approach increase the likelihood of approval. Relatively more evidence supports the Leviathan government and agenda-setting theories in explaining overrides of Massachusetts's property tax limit.