The impact of social impact bond financing

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hevenstone, Debra; Fraser, Alec; Hobi, Lukas; Przepiorka, Wojtek; Geuke, Gemma G. M.
• 署名单位: University of London; King's College London; Utrecht University; Utrecht University; Trimbos Institute
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3352
• DOI: 10.1111/puar.13631
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 930-946
• 关键词: performance management; public-sector; incentives; CHALLENGES; services; ORGANIZATIONS; governance; payment

摘要

Social impact bonds (SIBs), also known as Pay for Success, are an innovation in Payment by Results contracting. Investors finance programs and are repaid based on the SIB effect, which includes changes in outcomes attributable to financing. We generate a quantitative estimate of this part of the SIB effect for two active labor market programs in the Netherlands and Switzerland. Comparing program impacts within providers using SIB and non-SIB contracts suggests financing has positive impacts on public benefit receipt, employment, and income. Qualitative research suggests this is because SIB contracts increased pressure for all involved parties, leading to the institutionalization of selection and greater resources for SIB-financed services. Contracts with high pressure, like SIBs, may compromise both performance requirements and the potential to measure performance. We examine the implications of these findings in relation to agency and stewardship theories and highlight the significance of SIBs as multilateral as opposed to bilateral contracts.