Incentives and effort in the public and private sector

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: van Triest, Sander
• 署名单位: University of Amsterdam; University of Amsterdam
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3352
• DOI: 10.1111/puar.13691
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 233-247
• 关键词: performance-related pay; service motivation; job-satisfaction; for-performance; work; COMPENSATION; CONTRACTS; provision; ECONOMICS; Managers

摘要

While public service motivation theory suggests that public sector employees have higher levels of intrinsic motivation, average pay levels in the public sector are not lower, so public sector employees also value financial incentives. We investigate the relationship of financial incentives with effort (measured with unpaid overtime) for public versus private sector employees using a UK sample. Bonuses are used much less in the public sector, but their relationship with effort is not different between sectors. Public sector employees exert more effort when base pay is higher and do so to a somewhat higher extent than private sector employees. However, public sector employees increase effort more when effort is an important promotion criterion and when perceived job security is higher. Thus, implicit incentives resulting from being in a secure job and developing in that job are more effective for public sector employees than for private sector employees.