Populism and Political Appointments

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Cohen, Nissim; Duhl, Ron
• 署名单位: University of Haifa
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3352
• DOI: 10.1111/puar.70023
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: politicization; management; patronage

摘要

Do populist politicians increase the number of political appointments when they assume power? While the existing literature identifies politicization and political appointments as leading populist strategies, empirical evidence remains limited. Given the elusive nature of political appointments, it is challenging to assess their true extent in various contexts. Our research highlights how exemptions from a merit-based process are a major indicator of politicization. Through a systematic analysis of all exemptions from competition or a merit-based selection process in the Israeli civil service from January 1, 2000, to April 30, 2024, we provide empirical evidence linking populism and political appointments, suggesting deep and widespread politicization within the Israeli civil service. Our empirical evidence implies that Israel is probably among the leaders in this regard among developed democratic countries. In discussing our findings, we argue that, given the current global populist trend, public administration scholars should adopt a more critical stance toward political appointments.