Identity, threat aversion, and civil servants' policy preferences: Evidence from the European Parliament

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kuehnhanss, Colin R.; Murdoch, Zuzana; Geys, Benny; Heyndels, Bruno
• 署名单位: Vrije Universiteit Brussel; University of Agder; BI Norwegian Business School
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3298
• DOI: 10.1111/padm.12348
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 1009-1025
• 关键词: performance information; CHOICE; officials; RISK; attitudes; DECISION; biases; field

摘要

Distinct policy options are typically characterized by a number of advantages (or opportunities') and disadvantages (or threats'). The preference for one option over another depends on how individuals within an organization perceive these opportunities and threats. In this article, we argue that individuals' identification with an organization's core aims and objectives constitutes a key determinant of this perception. We propose that stronger identification shifts individuals' attention towards potential threats rather than opportunities in the payoff distribution, encouraging avoidance of negative outcomes. Moreover, we argue that this prevention focus' in individuals' motivational basis will be stronger under negative than under positive selection strategies. An original survey experiment with civil servants in the European Parliament finds significant evidence supporting the empirical implications of our argument.