Double standards? How historical and political aspiration levels guide managerial performance information use

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Holm, Jakob Majlund
• 署名单位: Aarhus University
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3298
• DOI: 10.1111/padm.12379
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 1026-1040
• 关键词: reference points; decision-making; behavioral-model; public-services; attention; RISK; management; ambiguity; feedback; FUTURE

摘要

Performance evaluations are a vital part of how public managers react to performance information. Yet, we know little about the way evaluations unfold and the reactions they produce. This article examines the idea that historical and political aspiration levels guide evaluations by labelling performance results as either a failure or success. Thus, the same result could lead to different evaluations and reactions depending on the aspiration level. The study also tests the idea that a negativity bias characterizes managers' reactions to political performance feedback. A survey experiment among a sample of principals in Danish public schools is used to examine these hypotheses. The results show that aspiration levels change principals' interpretation and reaction to otherwise identical performance results, but primarily in situations with positive historical and political feedback. Conflicting feedback from two aspiration levels makes principals rely mostly on the signals from the historical aspiration level.