Collaborative gaming: When principals and agents agree to game the system

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pierre, Jon; de Fine Licht, Jenny
• 署名单位: University of Gothenburg; University of Gothenburg
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3298
• DOI: 10.1111/padm.12720
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 711-722
• 关键词: performance management; bounded rationality; public-sector; ACCOUNTABILITY; targets; english

摘要

This paper presents a previously unexplored type of gaming of performance data, collaborative gaming, where the performance measurement system incentivizes the executive and an agency to game collaboratively. The paper shows how overlapping incentives between government departments and agencies to present successful implementation of programs can drive collaboration to modify performance targets and/or performance measurements. The argument is illustrated by two brief case studies of collaboration between the Swedish Department of Employment and the Swedish Public Employment Service in the implementation of labor-market programs.