Legislative influence on administrative decision making in Pennsylvania's Abandoned and Orphan Well Plugging Program

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bang, Insik; Hollibaugh, Gary E.
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3298
• DOI: 10.1111/padm.12764
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 737-758
• 关键词: proportional hazards; distributive politics; personal vote; REPRESENTATION; POLICY; bureaucracy; allocation; president; models; tests

摘要

To what extent are elected legislators able to influence administrative decision making? Recent research has been divided on this question, with some studies suggesting legislators are effectively unable to influence administrative outcomes, whereas others suggesting influence is common. Here, we examine this question in the context of Pennsylvania's Abandoned and Orphan Well Plugging Program (WPP). Despite the WPP using objective evaluative criteria to prioritize which abandoned and orphan oil and gas wells should be plugged before others, our results suggest legislators are able to influence the WPP's decisions. Specifically, we find that wells are plugged more quickly when the districts in which they are located are represented by (a) more experienced legislators, (b) legislators who sit on the state House or Senate Environmental Resources and Energy Committees, and (c) more liberal/Democratic legislators. These results have implications for those interested and involved in the legislative-administrative nexus.