Does Outsourcing Reduce Public Scrutiny Toward Elected Officials?: Insights From US Municipal Water Management

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Barnes, Jesse L.; Koebele, Elizabeth A.; Deslatte, Aaron
• 署名单位: Nevada System of Higher Education (NSHE); University of Nevada Reno; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3298
• DOI: 10.1111/padm.13058
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 707-725
• 关键词: citizen satisfaction; GOVERNMENT; service; ACCOUNTABILITY; privatization; delivery; PRIVATE; sustainability; governance; QUALITY

摘要

Amidst 21st-century climate-related threats, municipal elected officials (EOs) may outsource public services to third parties to avoid the political costs of adopting unpopular sustainability policies-a strategy known as political decoupling. However, decoupling raises accountability concerns and may not improve sustainability, leading some municipalities to recouple services. To help understand the political impacts of these decisions, we assess how public scrutiny toward EOs in US municipalities changes after varying degrees of coupling in the water provision sector (i.e., how much service delivery shifts away from or toward municipal oversight). Analysis of local media coverage shows public attention toward EOs decreases after higher degrees of decoupling and recoupling, public opinion becomes polarized toward EOs after decouplings, and the public links sustainability-related issues to EOs after high degrees of decoupling. The results highlight how reforming public services relates to political accountability-related factors and raise critical questions about the political decoupling strategy.