Bureaucratic redundancy and administrative burden: Evidence from public-private partnerships (PPPs) in China

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Xiong, Wei; Wang, Feng; Christensen, Tom; Casady, Carter B.
• 署名单位: Tongji University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; University of Oslo; Stanford University; George Mason University; University of London; University College London
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3298
• DOI: 10.1111/padm.13003
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 66-93
• 关键词: local-government; ECONOMIC-GROWTH; EMPLOYEE HEALTH; size; state; REFORM; COSTS; performance; IMPACT

摘要

Administrative burden is experienced by both individuals and businesses when dealing with government entities. While previous literature suggests administrative burden arises from the deliberate choices of political actors, this study highlights how bureaucratic redundancies also lead to administrative burden. Using a dataset of public-private partnerships (PPPs) in China, this study explored the influence of bureaucratic redundancy on administrative burden, in particular contractors' compliance costs caused by PPP regulations. The analysis found that bureaucratic redundancy has a positive and curvilinear relationship with compliance costs, which in turn has a positive relationship with the likelihood of PPP contract termination. These results hold even after controlling for political and economic factors. Nevertheless, such effects can be mitigated through government reforms, such as jurisdictional reduction and legislative centralization.