The Strategic Games that Donors and Bureaucrats Play: An Institutional Rational Choice Analysis

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Araral, Eduardo
• 署名单位: National University of Singapore
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1053-1858
• DOI: 10.1093/jopart/mun024
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 853-871
• 关键词: foreign-aid; fungibility

摘要

Foreign aid plays an important role in developing countries, but little is empirically known how it affects incentives of recipient bureaucracies. I provide a model and analytic case study to understand the strategic games that donors and bureaucrats play. My findings are broadly consistent with the theoretical expectations of institutional rational choice: bureaucrats attempt to ensure bureaucratic survival, whereas donors ensure growth of loan portfolio. These findings, however, are not consistent with the Samaritan's Dilemma and the Patron's Dilemma.