At the Discretion of Rogue Agents: How Automation Improves Women's Outcomes in Unemployment Insurance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wenger, Jeffrey B.; Wilkins, Vicky M.
• 署名单位: University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1053-1858
• DOI: 10.1093/jopart/mum044
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 313-333
• 关键词: Bureaucracy; GOVERNMENT; services; Chicago

摘要

Automation curtails the discretion of street-level bureaucrats in several ways: bureaucrats have little control over the input of data by claimants, management has increased opportunities for monitoring, and given the possibility that clients will deal with multiple bureaucrats, coworkers can now identify rogue agents. Some clients of a bureaucracy may benefit from the introduction of automation when the agency is biased against them. We test this claim by examining the recent introduction of the telephone claims in state Unemployment Insurance offices. Using state-level panel data from 1992 to 2005, we estimate the effect of filing a claim via telephone rather than in person. If street-level bureaucrats in this agency used their discretion to disentitle and punish clients who they deem undeserving of the policy benefits, then the introduction of automation could increase unemployment insurance (UI) payments for clients. Indeed, we find that telephone claims filing increases the number of women receiving UI benefits while having no effect on men. We posit that this finding is due to the elimination of the bias women previously faced when they entered a UI office.