The Organization of Discipline: From Performance Management to Perversity and Punishment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Soss, Joe; Fording, Richard; Schram, Sanford F.
• 署名单位: University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Kentucky; Bryn Mawr College
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1053-1858
• DOI: 10.1093/jopart/muq095
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: I203-I232
• 关键词: Welfare; governance; DISCRETION; nonprofit

摘要

Drawing on participant observation, in-depth interviews, and statistical analysis of administrative data, this article explores the operation of performance management in the Florida Welfare Transition program and its effects on decisions to sanction welfare clients. Unlike most econometric research on welfare sanctions, we approach sanctioning as an organized practice that reflects, not just client characteristics and behaviors, but also organizational needs, routines, values, authority relations, environments, and systems of reward and punishment. Our analysis focuses on the organization of discipline and, in the process, suggests that scholars may misrepresent and misinterpret the incidence of discipline when they fail to account for the dynamic ways that organization and management shape sanctioning patterns.