When Professionals Lead: Executive Management, Normative Isomorphism, and Policy Implementation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Teodoro, Manuel P.
• 署名单位: Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1053-1858
• DOI: 10.1093/jopart/muu039
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 983-1004
• 关键词: PUBLIC-SECTOR; performance; ORGANIZATIONS; diversity; service; FIELDS

摘要

If professionalism shapes executive behavior significantly, then agencies whose executives belong to a particular profession ought to manage differently from similarly situated executives who do not, and in ways that affect organizational outcomes. Extending theories of normative isomorphism to executive management, this study examines the effects of executives' professions on their management and their agencies' implementation of federal environmental regulations. Examining American local government water utilities, I argue that normative isomorphism causes executives who are engineers to manage their agencies differently from nonengineers. Illustrative case studies show how professions shape executive management. Since professional engineers were influential in the development of the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), its regulations reflect the dominant norms of the engineering profession. Analysis of data from a survey of utility executives and the Environmental Protection Agency shows that utilities that are headed by professional engineers violate the SDWA significantly less frequently than do utilities led by nonengineers. Results demonstrate normative isomorphism in executive management and highlight the significance of professionalism in policy design and implementation.