Naive Cronyism and Neutral Competence: Patronage, Performance, and Policy Agreement in Executive Appointments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hollibaugh, Gary E., Jr.
• 署名单位: University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1053-1858
• DOI: 10.1093/jopart/muu016
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 341-372
• 关键词: POLITICAL CONTROL; presidency; DELEGATION; expertise

摘要

Much of the bureaucratic literature suggests that, when staffing the bureaucracy, executives want agents who are both responsive to their political needs and possess the competence needed to fulfill their directives. However, institutional barriers-such as the requirement for legislative confirmation-exist that may make pursuing a strategy of responsive competence difficult, if not impossible. Here, I examine a model of bureaucratic appointments that allows for informationally imperfect agencies. I show that when legislative assent is required, trade-offs between ideology and either patronage or agency performance-or both-are often required to ensure legislative confirmation. The same dynamics are not present for unilateral appointments. Finally, using a data set that incorporates the ideologies of federal program managers, the performance of federal programs, and whether program managers were patronage appointees, I conduct a series of empirical tests that support the model's predictions.