Experts, Amateurs, and Bureaucratic Influence in the American States

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Boushey, Graeme T.; McGrath, Robert J.
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Irvine; George Mason University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1053-1858
• DOI: 10.1093/jopart/muw038
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 85-103
• 关键词: TERM LIMITS; legislative professionalism; statutory control; rulemaking; capacity; POWER; diffusion; MODEL

摘要

Over the past century, the size and reach of American state governments has increased dramatically, altering the balance of power across state capitols. Although state legislatures were historically privileged as firsts among equals, modern administrative reforms have transformed state governments from legislative-centric to executive-dominated systems. In many states, part-time citizen legislatures now operate alongside fully professionalized executives. We introduce a new measure capturing the relative professionalism of state legislative and executive branches, allowing us to explore the policy consequences of the rising imbalance of power across states governments. Drawing upon a large panel data set of proposed and adopted state regulations from 1990 through 2010, we demonstrate that the eroding policy expertise of state legislators has resulted in increased bureaucratic participation in the policy process, as amateur politicians rely more heavily on professionalized executive agencies to define problems and develop solutions. Our findings highlight intuitive, yet understudied, consequences of common institutional reforms and speak to recent and recurring debates about the separation of powers and public policymaking.