Agency Performance Challenges and Agency Politicization

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wood, Abby K.; Lewis, David E.
• 署名单位: University of Southern California; Vanderbilt University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1053-1858
• DOI: 10.1093/jopart/mux014
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 581-595
• 关键词: CIVIL-SERVICE; revenue forecasts; APPOINTMENTS; competence; GOVERNMENT; DISCRETION; freedom; spoils

摘要

In this article we evaluate the relationship between political control and bureaucratic performance using information requested by researchers via Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests and Congress via congressional committee requests. The information requested was the same, and the timing of requests was similar. We find modest evidence of a relationship between agency politicization and a lack of responsiveness to requests for information from the public and Congress. Politicized agencies are slower to respond to requests even when controlling for agency size and workload. There is little evidence, however, that these agencies are more likely to respond poorly when they do respond. The difficulties in responding appear to be due to poor performance of the FOIA offices, either because political actors focus more on other agency activities or because of poorer management agency-wide. We conclude that efforts to make agencies responsive to elected officials may hurt management performance.