STATE BUDGET PERIODICITY - AN ANALYSIS OF THE DETERMINANTS AND THE EFFECT ON STATE SPENDING

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: KEARNS, PS
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLICY ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1520-6819
• DOI: 10.2307/3325017
• 发表日期: 1994
• 页码: 331-362
• 关键词: group campaign contributions; government growth; Pressure groups; Attributes; models; voters; size

摘要

Much of the public budgeting literature focuses on the institutional rules of budgeting and how those rules affect process and outcomes. This study focuses on a particularly rudimentary rule of budgeting: the length of the budget period. State budgets are dictated (constitutionally or statutorily) to recur over one- or two-year intervals. Statistical analysis of the determinants of state budget periodicity shows that the more states spend, ceteris paribus, the more likely they are to budget annually. I hypothesize that budget periodicity has the opposite effect on spending: Biennial budget states spend more, ceteris paribus, than annual budget states spend. Ordinary least squares analysis does not support the hypothesis, but with instrumental variable methods, biennial budgeting exhibits a positive and statistically significant effect on state spending.