Political Control and Managerial Survival in State-Owned Enterprises

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ennser-Jedenastik, Laurenz
• 署名单位: University of Vienna
• 刊物名称: GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY ADMINISTRATION AND INSTITUTIONS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0952-1895
• DOI: 10.1111/gove.12023
• 发表日期: 2014
• 关键词: ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES; nonproportional hazards; FORMAL MODEL; DELEGATION; patronage; cabinet; ACCOUNTABILITY; INFORMATION; management; GOVERNMENT

摘要

This article explores the impact of political determinants on the survival of managers in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Drawing on theories of bureaucratic delegation, it is argued that preference divergence between principals and agents as well as among principals is a major driver of managerial turnover. More specifically, the partisan affiliation of SOE-managers with the government, the opposition, or individual ministers can serve to explain the length of their tenure. The analysis employs Cox proportional hazard regressions to test these hypotheses on an original data set of 1,671 managers serving in 87 public corporations in Austria between 1995 and 2010, thus presenting one of the first large-n analyses of political appointments in a parliamentary system. The results strongly support the proposition that partisan affiliation drives managerial survival.