Surviving Information Overload: How Elite Politicians Select Information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Walgrave, Stefaan; Dejaeghere, Yves
• 署名单位: University of Antwerp
• 刊物名称: GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY ADMINISTRATION AND INSTITUTIONS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0952-1895
• DOI: 10.1111/gove.12209
• 发表日期: 2017
• 关键词: rationality; science

摘要

Information in politics is overabundant. Especially elite politicians are bombarded with information. Politicians must be selective to stay on top of the information torrent. Aggregate-level work within the bounded rationality framework showed that information selection is at the core of decision making. Yet, an answer to the question as to how individual elite politicians go about selecting information is lacking. We know that they unavoidably do, but how exactly they perform this selection task remains largely unknown. The article draws on interviews with 14 party leaders and ministers in Belgium about their information processing. We present a typology, and a funnel, of consecutive information selection mechanisms and attitudes. Politicians partially outsource their information selection to procedures and/or staffers, they personally apply rigorous rules of thumb about what to attend to and what not, and they compensate the pressure and constant risk of messing up with a large dose of self-confidence.