China's Hybrid Adaptive Bureaucracy: The Case of the 863 Program for Science and Technology

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Zhi, Qiang; Pearson, Margaret M.
• 署名单位: Central University of Finance & Economics; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
• 刊物名称: GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY ADMINISTRATION AND INSTITUTIONS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0952-1895
• DOI: 10.1111/gove.12245
• 发表日期: 2017
• 关键词: reform

摘要

Portrayals of China's bureaucratic behavior tend to emphasize either streamlined central control via top-down directives emanating from a Leninist system, or a highly fragmented organization characterized by continuous horizontal bargaining. While both views have merit, they miss important but little-recognized dynamics of Chinese bureaucratic behavior. Examination of the 30-year evolution of a single organization, China's 863 Program, allows us a unique look inside the black box of decision making. First, we highlight a largely unrecognized mechanism of top-down control: a signal-response process that fosters substantial uncertainty for officials in the system. Second, our case highlights a circumstance in which reformers made radical movesdeployed as a band-aid layer of rational-instrumentalismto meet a perceived external security threat. These moves demonstrate efforts to incorporate Weberian norms, and suggest sources of dynamism and learning in a hybrid adaptive bureaucracy.